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Abstract
Set against the backdrop of Nebraska’s 2015 legislative repeal of the death penalty
and the 2016 electoral reinstatement, we examined public support for capital punishment. Using two years of statewide survey data, we compared respondents who
preferred the death penalty for murder, those who preferred other penalties, and
those who were unsure, a respondent group often excluded from research. To understand what distinguishes among these groups, we examined media consumption,
instrumental and expressive feelings about crime, and confidence and trust in the
government regarding criminal justice. Results revealed that those who preferred
the death penalty expressed more anger about crime and greater distrust, but perceived the death penalty as applied more fairly, relative to the other groups. The
unsures, compared to those who preferred other penalties, were less trusting and
viewed the death penalty as applied more fairly. The persistence of public support
for capital punishment may best be understood for its symbolic, expressive qualities.
Keywords: capital punishment, death penalty, punitiveness

In 2015, Nebraska made national and international headlines, becoming the
first consistently conservative “red” state in the US to abolish the death penalty when the legislature overrode the governor’s veto on Nebraska Legislative Bill 268 (LB268) (BBC, 2015; Bearman, 2015a; Bosman, 2015). This action reflected a larger movement among conservative lawmakers who were
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revisiting the tough-on-crime stance that dominated past decades (Pickett,
2016), as well as initiatives in other states to eliminate the death penalty
(Seiver, 2015). Nevertheless, during the 2016 election cycle, following a campaign by pro-death penalty politicians and special interest groups, Nebraskans voted to keep capital punishment (Cohen, 2016). In spite of some politicians – and because of others – the reinstatement of capital punishment
directly reflected popular will (Garland, 2010).
Why has declining public support, at least nationally (Gallup, n.d.), not
readily translated to public action at the polls? Researchers have identified
several factors that are related to death penalty support, including media
consumption (Britto and Noga-Styron, 2014; Kleck and Jackson, 2017), instrumental and expressive concerns about crime (Wozniak, 2017), and attitudes about the government and fairness of the justice system (Peffley and
Hurwitz, 2007; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). Conspicuously absent from much
of the research, however, are those people who respond to death penalty
opinion questions with “no opinion” or “unsure” (Unnever et al., 2005). Discovering their motivations may yield insights into why public opinion polls
do not neatly align with political preferences. Indeed, Garland (2005: 360)
theorized that political change toward full abolition will tend to occur when
this “uncommitted, ambivalent group” can be mobilized.
Using Nebraska as a case study, our primary purpose was to distinguish
among those who preferred the death penalty for murder, those who preferred other penalties (e.g., life sentences), and the “unsures,” examining
a series of factors that have been theoretically and/or empirically linked to
death penalty support. To begin, we review public support for the death penalty in national polls and discuss how the unsures are typically handled in
death penalty research. Then, we outline the theoretical and empirical factors tied to punitiveness and support for the death penalty. To provide context we briefly describe Nebraska’s recent legislative history regarding capital punishment. In our analysis, we draw on two statewide surveys gathered
during the death penalty legislative debate and ballot initiative. We examine how media consumption, instrumental and expressive concerns about
crime, and attitudes about the government’s role in controlling crime and
the application of the death penalty distinguished among the three groups.
We conclude with a discussion of the unsures and the symbolic, expressive
nature of death penalty support.

Public support for the death penalty
While states grapple with cost and equity issues, public opinion on capital
punishment has slowly waned. National polls show a decline in public support for the death penalty since the peak years in the mid-1990s. At its 1994
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peak, Gallup (n.d.) noted 80% of people were in favor of the death penalty,
compared to 60% in 2016. Pew Research placed that recent figure even
lower, with 49% of respondents favoring capital punishment and 42% opposing it (Oliphant, 2016). Support of life imprisonment for murder, in contrast, has increased, from 29% in 1993 to 45% in 2014 (Gallup, n.d.). There
have been substantial declines in the belief that the death penalty is a deterrent, such that two-thirds of people do not think it deters serious crimes
(Gallup, n.d.; Pew Research Center, 2015). There has also been a decline in
the belief that the death penalty is fairly applied, from 61% in 2005 to 50%
in 2016 (Gallup, n.d.), and nearly three-fourths of people think there is a
risk of executing an innocent person (Pew Research Center, 2015). Reflecting the decline in support and the increase in doubts about the death penalty, several states have issued moratoria on capital punishment or discontinued the penalty altogether (Death Penalty Information Center, n.d.(b)). The
overall declining support for capital punishment across the nation stands in
contrast to what Nebraska voters ultimately decided in 2016 (Cohen, 2016).
The elusive unsures
A long-standing issue in death penalty research is how to best measure people’s opinions, acknowledging that the way in which a support question is
asked influences results (Unnever et al., 2005; Worthen et al., 2014; Wozniak, 2017).1 In particular, scholars have recognized that when people are
given the option of the death penalty alongside other alternatives like a life
sentence, the proportion of respondents selecting the death penalty declines.
Response options to survey items about support also vary in format. Survey
items may be forced-choice, so that people who have no opinion or who are
unsure may skip the question entirely rather than choose an option that does
not represent their opinions. Other items may explicitly offer a response option such as “don’t know” or “unsure” that allows these undecided respondents a valid choice. In either case, respondents who answer “no opinion,”
“don’t know,” or “unsure” to death penalty questions are often excluded from
the conversation because they are coded into missing for analytic purposes
(e.g., Unnever et al., 2005).2 Because such answers are not random this approach may result in sample selection bias (Oravecz et al., 2014).
Those who do not express an opinion on surveys may not care about the
topic, may be reticent to answer political questions, may have weakly-held
attitudes, or may be truly unsure (Laurison, 2015; Luskin and Bullock, 2011;
Oravecz et al., 2014). Gallup polls from 1995 to 2016 indicate a decline in
those who answer “no opinion” to a question asking if respondents are in
favor of the death penalty, from 10% to 3%. Likewise, reports from 2000 to
2014 illustrate that gains in the proportion of people supporting life imprisonment over the death penalty have been accompanied by declines in the
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no opinion group. Such trends hint that this block may be more malleable
or movable by contemporaneous political climate regarding capital punishment (Garland, 2005). For example, Unnever et al. (2005: 207) noted that
a significant portion of poll respondents only weakly supported the death
penalty and many had reservations about it. Weakly-held attitudes about the
death penalty may be due to the availability of new information about problems with capital punishment, as well as conflicting core values regarding
the sanctity of life, retribution, and fairness.
Understanding punitiveness and attitudes about the death penalty
Due to measurement limitations and theoretical inattention, little is known
about who the unsures are and how they may differ from those respondents
who have clearer opinions. Demographically, death penalty supporters, compared to nonsupporters, tend to be men, White, older, and politically conservative (Anderson et al., 2017; Pew Research Center, 2015). Research has
explored several factors contribute to individual attitudes about the death
penalty and punitive sentiment more generally; as noted, such research typically excludes the unsures.
First, research points to media framing of crime as the work of immoral
yet rational actors and its connection with punitiveness (Dowler, 2003;
Surette, 2003). The framing of the crime problem in the media (Altheide
and Michalowski, 1999) and by politicians (Frost, 2010) typically reinforces
the punitive status quo when it comes to punishment. According to Enns
(2016), in the aggregate, reporting about crime and the tone of that reporting has generally influenced public punitiveness over time. Media consumption, across several genres, has been linked to support for more punitive attitudes (Kleck and Jackson, 2017; Rosenberger and Callanan, 2011)
and support for the death penalty (Britto and Noga-Styron, 2014; Kleck and
Jackson, 2017; Kort-Butler and Sittner, 2011). News viewing has also been
linked with strongly held opinions favorable to the death penalty (Unnever
et al., 2005).
The media are implicated in what many people see and know about crime,
but media consumption itself is typically insufficient in explaining punitiveness. People’s perceptions of crime may shape their attitudes about punishment. Thus, a second set of factors focuses on whether attitudes arise from
instrumental versus expressive stances regarding crime and punishment
(Wozniak, 2017). Personal concerns about crime, risk, and victimization
may evoke an instrumental response, namely advocating for harsher punishments to curb or control crime. People often report that the crime rate is on
the rise, even when official data show it is not (Gramlich, 2017; McCarthy,
2015). This belief may be tied to media saturation with crime (Goidel et al.,
2006; Lowry et al., 2003), heightened political wrangling over crime issues
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(Beckett, 1997), as well as personal experiences with crime (Weitzer and Kubrin, 2004) that may make the crime issue particularly salient (Frost, 2010).
If people believe crime is a problem or are worried about victimization,
they may prefer more punitive forms of punishment in order to preserve
public safety. When people believe the crime rate is problematic, they tend to
be supportive of more absolute and punitive forms of punishment (Unnever
and Cullen, 2010). Yet, research on the effect of instrumental concerns on
punitiveness is mixed. Kleck and Jackson (2017) found that perceptions of
the crime rate, perceived risk, and fear of crime were generally unrelated to
death penalty support and punitive attitudes, whereas Costelloe et al. (2009)
found that fear of crime and general concern about crime were related to
greater punitiveness. Worry about or fear of crime has frequently been examined, although the connection between fear and death penalty support is
also equivocal (e.g., Kort-Butler and Sittner, 2011; Wozniak, 2017).
Punitive sentiments may also be value expressive (Vollum and Buffington-Vollum, 2010), potentially outweighing instrumental concerns (Tyler and
Weber, 1982). The idea—if not the practice—of the death penalty has moral
and emotional appeal (Garland, 2010). Pew Research Center (2015) found
that two-thirds of people felt the death penalty for murder is morally justified. Moreover, specifically among those who said they supported the death
penalty, 90% felt it was morally justified. Advocating for harsher sentences
or capital punishment expresses the moral outrage associated with crime
and those who commit it, as well as the moral imperative for retribution and
just deserts (Lynch, 2002; Unnever and Cullen, 2010).
Anger specifically about crime may be expressed through punitiveness. In
fact, anger may be a more common reaction to crime than fear (Ditton et al.,
1999). Anger may be centered in perceived threats to the moral order posed
by crime, perceived inability to maintain public order, or broader insecurities resulting from social change (Ditton et al., 1999; Karstedt, 2002; Lyons
and Scheingold, 2000). Moreover, in socio-political periods characterized by
instability or insecurity, punitiveness may represent an appeal to “hostile
solidarity,” in which people can experience both an emotional release and a
sense of belonging predicated on fiercely othering criminals (Carvalho and
Chamberlen, 2018: 228). Anger about crime has been linked to support for
punitive policies, controlling for fear (Goodall et al., 2013; Hartnagel and
Templeton, 2012; Johnson, 2009).
A third set of factors is people’s beliefs in the ability of the government to
apply the death penalty fairly and to address crime reliably. Nearly threefourths of people in a Pew poll saw some risk in an innocent person being
executed, and half thought minorities were more likely to receive the death
penalty (Pew Research Center, 2015). Indeed, the decline in support for the
death penalty has been linked to the belief that it is applied unfairly, particularly along racial lines (Peffley and Hurwitz, 2007). Wozniak (2017) found
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that people who thought justice system was fair and unbiased more strongly
supported death penalty. Relatedly, Baumgartner et al. (2008) argued that
increased coverage of potential errors in the capital punishment process and
the possibility of wrongful executions— the “innocence frame”—contributed
to the declining public support for the death penalty. Research suggests that
people exposed to cases situated within the innocence frame are more likely
to take those concerns into consideration when thinking about the death penalty (Dardis et al., 2008; Lambert et al., 2011).
Despite the effects of the innocence frame and the slow national decline
in favorable attitudes, public support for the death penalty persists. One explanation for the American public’s persistent punitiveness is the escalating
crime-distrust model (Unnever and Cullen, 2010). According to this model,
the public’s belief that crime is pervasive and personally threatening exists in parallel to the belief that the government has failed in its efforts to
manage and control crime. Further, the government, as represented by the
courts, has failed to protect victims by coddling criminals. The ostensible
solution, then, is to crack down on criminals through legislation mandating
harsher punishments. Citing the cultural contradiction that a populace that
distrusts it government nonetheless empowers it to execute people, Zimring
(2003) argued that American culture required a reframing of capital punishment’s purpose after the death penalty was reinstated in 1976. Capital punishment was fashioned as justice for the victims and closure for their families, couched in the vigilante tradition in which the community takes care
of its own. This sense of vigilantism may nullify distrust, making execution
palatable to the citizenry.
Research on trust in government and punitiveness is equivocal, due in
part to the variety of ways in which trust has been operationalized. Studies
focused specifically on courts have found no association between trust and
death penalty support (Brown and Socia, 2017; Unnever and Cullen, 2010).
Using a broader measure of distrust, Unnever et al. (2005) found no effect
on death penalty support. Soss et al. (2003) also used a broader measure of
government trust and found trust was associated with death penalty support among Whites. Similarly, Messner et al. (2006) found that Whites who
distrusted government were more likely to support the death penalty, but
African-Americans who distrusted government were less likely to support
it. Other research suggests people who distrust the government, or find it
lacking when it comes to punishment, are more punitive (Bader et al., 2010;
Wonziak, 2017; Zimring et al., 2001).
The current study
Prior research offers insight into the factors associated with death penalty
support. Missing from these analyses, however, is an explicit attempt to
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uncover the how supporters differ from both opponents and people who are
unsure of their position. Knowing more about the latter group may yield insight into the differences between the opinion polls and the voting booths.
The overarching purpose of the study was to understand what factors distinguish among people who prefer the death penalty for murder, people who
prefer other penalties (e.g., life sentences), and the unsures, addressing a
specific gap in the literature. The recent political focus on capital punishment in Nebraska offers a unique opportunity to study public opinion in a
context where those opinions could have real-world impact.
Nebraska is one of two states in the United States with a unicameral legislature; the legislature is officially nonpartisan, although Republicans hold
the majority of seats. Currently, 11 inmates in Nebraska are under death
sentences (Death Penalty Information Center, n.d.(a)). In 2015, Senator Ernie Chambers, a perennial opponent of capital punishment, introduced legislation to abolish the death penalty.3 Several senators added their names as
co-introducers of LB268, an effort that saw cooperation across the political
spectrum. In part, Nebraska’s attempt to abolish the death penalty echoed
the political tone of “Right on Crime” conservative advocates for criminal
justice reforms, who are motivated by the costs of bloated correctional systems (Green, 2015; Phelps, 2016; Travis, 2014). Arguments for Nebraska’s
repeal were fueled by fiscal concerns as well as by concerns with a broken
system (Bearman, 2015b).
LB268 passed, Governor Ricketts vetoed the bill, and the legislature overrode the veto by a one-vote margin. Nebraska thus became the first “red”
state in the modern era to abolish the death penalty. However, a privatelyfunded petition drive, which received money from the governor himself, led
to a 2016 ballot initiative to reinstate capital punishment (Duggan, 2016;
Young, 2015). In contrast to abolition movements in other nations, in this
case political elites favoring reinstatement, including the governor and some
state senators, successfully tapped into penal populism (Beale, 2014; Suh,
2015). Nebraskans voted 61% to 39% to keep the death penalty, although
the urban centers of Omaha and Lincoln were more evenly divided (Hammel, 2016; Nebraska Secretary of State, 2016). In 2018, Nebraska carried out
its first execution since 1997, which was also its first to use lethal injection
(Duggan, Hammel, Nitcher, & Stoddard, 2018; The Marshall Project, 2018).
Nebraska’s experience offers a case study of the nature of public support
for the death penalty. Further, the timing of two state-wide surveys allowed
us to capture a specific historical moment, in the wake of the 2015 legislative repeal, then leading to the 2016 election; to our knowledge, no other
study on the sources of death penalty support has taken this approach. We
compared those who preferred the death penalty to those who preferred
other penalties and those who were unsure, testing factors that may distinguish among these three groups. We considered TV news consumption,
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instrumental concerns (i.e., people’s perceptions about the crime rate and
their worry about crime), expressive concerns (i.e., anger about crime), and
their attitudes about the government’s role in controlling crime (i.e., fairness, confidence in the justice system, and trust).
Based on prior work, we posited that death penalty supporters would be
more likely than supporters of other penalties to: consume TV news, believe
the crime rate is increasing, worry more about crime, feel angrier about
crime, think the death penalty is applied fairly, express confidence for the
justice system, but express less trust in the government on crime. We considered our comparisons among death penalty supporters, alternative penalty
supporters, and the unsures to be exploratory, although we anticipated the
unsures would occupy more ambivalent positions on the independent variables. Our use of two years of data present an opportunity to discover factors that consistently (or not) distinguish among these groups, set against
a unique historical backdrop.

Methods
Data
Data for this study came from two cross-sectional population-based omnibus surveys, the Nebraska Annual Social Indicator Survey (NASIS). The surveys were conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research at the University
of Nebraska – Lincoln. Data were collected each year through mail surveys
sent to addresses obtained from the US Postal Services Delivery Sequence
File. This method yields high coverage for household populations (English
et al., 2012). Data use the “next birthday” method to maintain a probability
sample (Dillman et al., 2014).
The 2015 NASIS was collected between 12 August and 20 October, and
the response rate was 32.7% (AAPOR RR2). Data collection for the 2016 NASIS occurred between 1 September and 10 November, and yielded a response
rate of 26.9% (AAPOR RR2).4 Listwise deletion was used for both samples,
and the final analytic samples were 837 for 2015 and 934 for 2016. Analyses employed the population weights provided for each survey.5
Measures
Dependent variable. Death penalty support was measured similarly to the
Gallup item (Jones and Saad, 2014). The question asked “If you could choose
between the following approaches, which do you think is the best penalty
for murder?” The options were “death penalty,” “life in prison without the
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possibility of parole,” “prison with the possibility of parole,” and “unsure/do
not want to answer.” For analysis, both types of prison sentences, with and
without the possibility of parole, were combined to form one group, other
penalty preference.
Independent variables. The NASIS asked how many days in an average week
respondents watched “local TV news.” The local news variable was then
coded so that higher numbers represent more frequent viewing. To measure national news, the surveys asked two questions about average weekly
viewing of “national network TV news on ABC, CBS, or NBC” and “national
cable TV news, like CNN, FOX, or MSNBC.” These two questions were averaged together to create a single indicator of national news viewing, where
higher numbers represent higher frequency of viewing.
Perceptions of changes in the crime rate in the United States were measured by asking respondents to indicate if they thought the rate of crime in
the United States seemed to be decreasing, staying about the same, or increasing. A dichotomous variable was then created where responses that the
crime rate seemed to be increasing were coded 1 and decreasing or staying
about the same were coded 0.
Worry about crime was measured by asking respondents how often they
personally worried about walking alone at night, having their residence
being broken into, getting robbed, getting raped or sexually attacked, getting murdered, and a family member being a victim of a crime. The four response options ranged from “not all worried” to “very worried.” Items were
coded so that higher values indicate more worry, and a mean scale of worry
was created from the available questions (a=0.87 in 2015; a=0.85 in 2016).
Anger about crime was measured with two questions about how angry
people felt when they thought about “crime in this country” and “crime in
your community.” The four response options ranged from “not at all angry”
to “very angry.” The items were coded so that higher values indicated more
anger (Johnson, 2009). The two anger items were highly correlated (r=.75
in 2015; r=.66 in 2016), so they were averaged to create a single variable
for anger. The perceived fairness of the death penalty item asked people to
denote how fair the justice system is in its use of the death penalty (Jones
and Saad, 2014). The four response options ranged from “not at all fair” to
“very fair.” The variable was coded so that higher values indicate higher levels of perceived fairness.
Confidence in the criminal justice system was assessed with four items
asking how confident respondents were that the criminal justice system
could reduce crime and reduce drug use, and how confident they were the
police could protect them from violent crimes like assault and from property crimes like theft (Jones and Saad, 2014). The four response categories
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ranged from “not at all confident” to “very confident.” The items were coded
so that higher values indicate more confidence, then a mean score was created from the available items (α =.82 in 2015; α=.79 in 2016).
Trust in government information about crime was measured by asking
people to indicate how reliable they think the government is as a source of
information about crime (Kort-Butler and Sittner, 2011). The four response
options ranged from “not at all reliable” to “very reliable.” The variables
were coded so that higher values indicate higher levels of trust in the government as a source of information about crime.
Control variables. A number of demographic variables were included as controls (Lambert et al., 2011; Oliphant, 2016; Vollum et al., 2004). Urban was
measured by giving respondents the options “Town/city,” “Farm,” and “Open
country.” The variable was dichotomized where those that indicated town/
city were coded 1 and others were coded 0. Race was a dichotomous variable: respondents who indicated that they were White were coded 1 and all
other racial groups were coded 0. Male respondents were coded 1 and female
respondents were coded 0. Education was a dichotomous variable where a
bachelor’s degree or higher degree was coded 1, and less than a bachelor’s
degree was coded 0. Political conservativism was a five-point scale on which
respondents rated themselves from very liberal (1) to very conservative (5).
Religious affiliation was a dummy variable where Catholic was coded 1 and
all other religious affiliations (or lack thereof) were coded 0.6
Finally, a control was also included for victimization experiences. In the
2016 NASIS, respondents were asked if they had been a victim of any crime
in the 12 months. In the 2015 NASIS, however, the question asked “Have
you, or has any person close to you, been a victim of a crime in the last 12
months?” On both surveys, the response options were yes (coded 1) or no
(coded 0).
Analytic strategy
To begin our study, we examined how demographic characteristics and the
substantive variables differed across the three groups of death penalty views.
Then, we conducted a series of multinomial logistic regression models to
determine what variables distinguished among the three groups. For each
year, a model was tested in which death penalty supporters were the reference group, and the other penalty preference and unsure groups were the
categories. A model was also tested in which other penalty preference was
the reference group, and death penalty preference and unsure groups were
the categories, allowing for a comparison between the other penalty preference and the unsures. Additional tests were performed to determine whether
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there were significant differences in the coefficients across years, the seemingly unrelated estimation (suest) and linear combinations of parameters
(lincom) commands in STATA.

Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for each year of data. The percentage of respondents who preferred the death penalty decreased five points
between 2015 (55%) and 2016 (50%). This decline was accompanied by an
increase in those that indicated that they preferred other penalties for murder, increasing from 35% in 2015 to 43% in 2016. Those who reported that
they were unsure about the best penalty for murder were at 10% in 2015
and 7% in 2016.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for each of the three groups; F-statistics were used to test for differences. There were no significant differences across groups in either year for worry about crime, confidence in the
criminal justice system, Catholic, and crime victim. Demographically in both
years, death penalty supporters were least likely to live in an urban setting,
more likely to be male, had the lowest prevalence of a bachelor’s degree, and
had the highest score on conservativism (Anderson et al., 2017).
Table 1. Weighted descriptive statistics.
2015 (n=837) 		

2016 (n=934)

Variable name

Mean/			
proportion SE
Range

Mean/
proportion

Death penalty preference
Other penalty preference
Unsures
Local news
National news
Increase in US crime rate
Worry about crime
Anger about crime
Death penalty fair
Confidence in justice system
Trust in gov’t info
Urban
White
Male
Bachelor’s degree
Conservatism
Catholic
Crime victim

.552 		
.347 		
.101 		
4.094
.110
3.947
.089
.595 		
2.228
.025
2.923
.039
2.584
.046
1.945
.030
2.084
.032
.589 		
.892 		
.507 		
.518 		
3.235
.039
.283 		
.010 		

.497 		
.430 		
.073 		
4.122
.113
4.095
.088
.631 		
2.254
.027
2.993
.035
2.468
.043
2.113
.030
2.111
.034
.791 		
.951 		
.499 		
.536 		
3.322
.043
.283 		
.103 		

0–1
0–1
0–1
0–7
1–8
0–1
1–4
1–4
1–4
1–4
1–4
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
1–5
0–1
0–1

SE

Range
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–7
1–8
0–1
1–4
1–4
1–4
1–4
1–4
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
1–5
0–1
0–1

Local news
National news
Increase in US crime rate
Worry about crime
Anger about crime
Death penalty fair
Confidence in justice system
Trust in gov’t info
Urban
White
Male
Bachelor’s degree
Conservatism
Catholic
Crime victim

Variable

%

3.71
3.68
0.48
2.18
2.67
2.16
1.98
2.35
0.68
0.91
0.46
0.69
3.01
0.34
0.09

Mean/
Proportion

Mean/
Proportion
4.39
4.20
0.67
2.25
3.08
2.89
1.92
1.93
0.52
0.88
0.56
0.42
3.42
0.25
0.11

35

55

3.77
3.44
0.55
2.24
2.81
2.38
1.96
1.98
0.63
0.89
0.37
0.47
3.01
0.29
0.10

20.77***
0.87**
10.05***
0.77
13.08***
30.23***
0.51
22.53***
7.67***
0.42
5.04**
20.77***
13.68***
2.75
0.25

Mean/ 		
Proportion
F-statistic

10 		

Death penalty Other penalty			
preference
preference
Unsures		

3.95
4.01
0.74
2.26
3.17
2.87
2.10
1.95
0.74
0.97
0.56
0.46
3.56
0.26
0.10

Mean/
Proportion

50

4.18
4.14
0.50
2.25
2.81
2.00
2.13
2.30
0.84
0.94
0.44
0.63
3.04
0.30
0.11

Mean/
Proportion

43

Death penalty Other penalty
preference
preference

2015 				
2016

Table 2. Weighted descriptive statistics by best punishment for murder preference.

4.94
4.43
0.61
2.19
2.84
2.53
2.11
2.11
0.81
0.86
0.47
0.50
3.37
0.32
0.06

Mean/
Proportion

7

Unsures

3.24*
0.99
16.87***
0.23
13.84***
55.52***
0.21
13.53***
4.04*
3.19*
3.96*
8.77***
17.65***
0.78
1.00

F-statistic
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Examining viewership of local and national news indicates that in 2015
death penalty supporters had the highest viewership, but in 2016 they had
the lowest viewership. In both 2015 and 2016, a large proportion of those
who preferred the death penalty believed that the US crime rate was increasing. They also had the highest means for anger about crime and perceived
fairness of the death penalty, but the lowest scores for trust in government
information about crime.
Table 3 depicts the results from the multinomial regression models in
which death penalty supporters serve as the reference category. The top
of the table shows the comparison between death penalty preference and
other penalty preference. In 2016 compared to death penalty supporters,
other penalty supporters were less likely to think that the crime rate in the
United States was increasing. In 2015 and 2016, other penalty supporters
were less angry about crime and less likely to think that the death penalty
is applied fairly. Other penalty supporters, compared to death penalty supporters, were also more likely to trust government information. Across both
years other penalty supporters, compared to death penalty supporters, were
less likely to be male, more likely to have a bachelor’s degree, and were less
conservative. Finally, in 2015 other penalty supporters were more likely to
be Catholic than were death penalty supporters.
The bottom of Table 3 shows the results of the multinomial regression
models comparing death penalty preference and those who were unsure
about the best punishment for murder. In both years, compared to death
penalty supporters, the unsures felt that the death penalty is applied less
fairly. In 2016 the unsures were more likely to watch local news (a significantly stronger relationship that in 2015; t = –2.05, p < .05), but felt less
angry about crime compared to those who preferred the death penalty. In
2015 the unsures were less likely to be male and were less conservative
compared to death penalty supporters, and in 2016, the unsures were less
likely to be White (a significantly stronger relationship that in 2016; t =
2.60, p < .01).
Table 4 shows the results from the multinomial regression models for
those who preferred other penalties compared to those who were unsure
about the best penalty for murder. There were two variables that distinguished between other penalty preference and the unsures. In 2015 and
2016, compared to other penalty supporters, the unsures believed that the
death penalty is applied more fairly (a marginally stronger relationship that
in 2016; t = –1.92, p < .10), but expressed less trust in the government. Additionally, in 2016, the unsures were more likely to watch local news. In
2015 the unsures were less likely to have a bachelor’s degree or higher education; in 2016, they were less likely to be White, compared to those who
preferred other penalties.
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Table 3. Multinomial regression comparing other penalty preference and the unsure respondents to death penalty preference.
		
Variable name
Other penalty preference
Local news
National news
Increase in US crime rate
Worry about crime
Anger about crime
Death penalty fair
Confidence in justice system
Trust in gov’t info
Urban
White
Male
Bachelor’s degree
Conservatism
Catholic
Crime victim
Unsure respondents
Local news
National news
Increase in US crime rate
Worry about crime
Anger about crime
Death penalty fair
Confidence in justice system
Trust in gov’t info
Urban
White
Male
Bachelor’s degree
Conservatism
Catholic
Crime victim
F

2015
RRR

2016
RRR

0.97
0.93
0.69
0.97
0.73**
0.54***
0.85
2.35***
1.45
1.78
0.61*
2.50***
0.78*
2.31***
0.83

1.08
1.02
0.54*
1.08
0.69*
0.43***
0.98
1.64**
1.55
0.51
0.58*
1.49*
0.75**
1.50
1.22

1.03
0.86
0.76
0.88
0.77
0.69**
1.10
0.97
1.36
1.12
0.37**
1.02
0.67*
1.47
0.92
5.84***

1.29**
0.95
0.70
0.80
0.59*
0.76*
0.95
1.06
1.48
0.14**
0.57
0.96
0.88
1.55
0.69
5.53***

Death penalty preference is the reference group. Relative risk ratio reported.
* p ≤ .05 ; ** p ≤ .01 ; *** p ≤ .001

Taken together, the regression analyses revealed that the key variables
distinguishing among the three groups were trust in government information about crime, perceived fairness of the death penalty, and anger about
crime. Table 2 highlights the significant differences in these three variables
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Table 4. Multinomial regression comparing the unsure respondents to other penalty preference.
Variable name

2015
RRR

2016
RRR

Unsure respondents
Local news
National news
Increase in US crime rate
Worry about crime
Anger about crime
Death penalty fair
Confidence in justice system
Trust in gov’t info
Urban
White
Male
Bachelor’s degree
Conservatism
Catholic
Crime victim
F

1.06
0.92
1.07
0.90
1.11
1.28*
1.30
0.41***
0.95
0.63
0.60
0.41**
0.86
0.63
1.13
5.84***

1.20*
0.93
1.30
0.74
0.86
1.75***
0.97
0.65*
0.96
0.27*
0.99
0.64
1.18
1.03
0.56
5.53***

Other penalty preference is the reference group. Relative risk ratios reported.
Contrast with death penalty preference not shown.
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001

across the groups. In both years, death penalty supporters were angriest
about crime, thought the death penalty was fairly applied, and had the least
trust in the government regarding crime; other penalty supporters were on
the other end of the spectrum.
Those who were unsure about the best penalty for murder generally fell
somewhere between the other two groups, but there was some variability
by year. In both years, death penalty supporters reported the greatest level
of perceived fairness, other penalty supporters the lowest level, with the unsures falling squarely in the middle. Although the unsures had low levels of
trust similar to death penalty supporters in 2015, in 2016 the unsures were
situated between the other two groups. In contrast, in 2015, the unsures
mean levels for anger were centered between the other groups, but in 2016
the unsures had levels of anger similar to other penalty supporters. Also
of note, given the regression results, is that the unsures reported watching
more local (and national) news in 2016 compared to the other two groups.
Few demographic characteristics robustly distinguished the unsures from
the other groups in the regressions, suggesting that attitudinal factors play
an important role.
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Discussion
Our analysis indicated that trust in the government’s information about
crime, perceptions of death penalty fairness, and anger about crime distinguished among death penalty support groups. The only instrumental concern that distinguished between death penalty preference and other penalty
preference appeared in 2016: leading into the election, death penalty supporters were more likely to believe the crime rate was increasing. Instead,
death penalty attitudes were rooted in people’s sentiments about the government and their feelings about crime.
The unsures, perhaps not surprisingly, tended to fall somewhere between
the other groups. Compared to death penalty supporters, the unsures were
less likely to believe the death penalty is fairly applied and were less angry
about crime. However, when compared to supporters of other penalties, the
unsures were more likely to view the death penalty as fairly applied yet express less trust in the government regarding crime information. Among the
unsures, ambivalence about capital punishment may be rooted in uncertainty
about both the fair application of the death penalty and the reliability of information the government provides about crime.
Presuming that the unsures have the most malleable position, we can only
speculate how this positioning ultimately influenced the 2016 vote.7 For example, it is perhaps telling that the unsures, compared to the other groups,
were more engaged in local news in 2016, when the death penalty received
a good deal of media coverage because of the impending vote. Nebraska’s
correctional system also experienced a string of high-profile problems leading into the 2016 election, including a riot that left two inmates dead, an escape of two inmates who had been convicted of violent crimes, assaults on
staff, and the start of trials associated with the riot. Drawing on Dardis et al.
(2008) and Wozniak (2017), we suggest that the unsures who are swayed to
death penalty support may feel the government cannot be trusted on crime,
prisons do not appear harsh enough, and the death penalty is “fair enough”
to err on the side of the status quo.
The results also lend support to Zimring’s (2003) theorizing about the
role of distrust in holding punitive sentiments. Unnever and Cullen (2010)
implied that instrumental concerns about crime function alongside distrust
to drive punitiveness; our instrumental measures generally had little impact in the models (Tyler and Weber, 1982). Instead, we found anger about
crime to be key (Hartnagel and Templeton, 2012). To the extent that anger
about crime is rooted in insecurities about the state of society or the moral
order, support for the death penalty is both value expressive and a matter of
principle (Vollum et al., 2004: 528). In this way, anger mirrors the emotive
nature of vigilantism described by Zimring. Indeed, Nebraska’s history includes strains of vigilantism (Kammer, 2011) and lynching (Menard, 2010).
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At the same time, trends toward abolition exist within contemporary political context (Garland, 2005). The 2015–2016 election cycle exposed anxieties that may have fermented a desire for hostile solidarity (Carvalho and
Chamberlen, 2018). Although the theoretical questions cannot be fully answered by this study, the tenacity of the death penalty in some American
states—even when their legislators move toward abolition—may best be understood for its symbolic and expressive qualities among the public (Beckett et al., 2016; Garland, 2010).

Limitations
A major limitation of this study was our inability to capture racial animus,
which prior research has demonstrated to be a central predictor of punitive
sentiments and death penalty support (Barkan and Cohn, 2005; Brown and
Socia, 2017; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). Likewise, we did not capture feelings of economic uncertainty (Lehmann and Pickett, 2016). Both factors may
be channeled through our broad measure of anger about crime (Elchardus
et al., 2008; Wozniak, 2016a), or they may exert independent effects that
would allow for a more well-rounded understanding of death penalty attitudes. Future analyses of within-state attitudes would benefit from including these measures.
Another limitation of this study was the slight inconsistencies in survey
structure between the years. As these were omnibus surveys, question order,
placement, and other formatting variations may also slightly influence responses. This may have contributed to some differences in the effects of variables within models across the years; however, the ability of the variables for
fairness, trust, and anger to consistently distinguish among the groups suggests the relevance of these forces for understanding death penalty attitudes.
Among the particular measures, there is room for improvement. First,
our measure of death penalty support echoes national polls, but it does limit
respondents to a small range of options. Attitudinal or Likert scales sometimes embed “neutral” or “uncertain” within the scales themselves, so that
unsure respondents are essentially captured between those who have clearer
opinions (Britto and Noga-Styron, 2014; Vollum et al., 2004). Other scales
designed to measure how important the topic is to the respondents, then assess “strength” of attitudes or the conditions under which respondents support the death penalty may allow for greater insight into factors associated
with uncertainty (Britto and Noga-Styron, 2014; Worthen et al., 2014). Second, whether the death penalty is “unfair” is left to respondents’ interpretation, which could reflect concerns about racial biases and/ or executing the
innocent (Peffley and Hurwitz, 2007). A more specific measure would better account for these explanations.
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Third, trust as measured here does not allow us to distinguish between
Unnever and Cullen’s (2010) and Zimring’s (2003) conceptualization of government distrust. Confidence in the system itself, which is generally how
distrust has been interpreted, had little impact in our models, but people
feeling the government was a reliable source of crime information did. The
language in the latter item may confound “information” with the narrower
concept of “official data,” as well as confound government with the media
who filter its information (Kort-Butler and Sittner, 2011). Future research is
necessary to explore how confidence, reliability, and trustworthiness are intertwined. Finally, our measure of value expressiveness—anger about crime—
is relatively narrow. Future research is needed in order to develop a fuller
range of expressive measures, particularly research that explores the intersections of moral outrage, hostility, insecurity, distrust, and punitiveness.
Nebraska’s experience may not be generalizable to other states, which
have unique histories and relationships with capital punishment. Additional
research within other states may yield commonalities as well as distinguishing characteristics (Doob and Webster, 2014). To reiterate, these were population samples, not samples of registered or likely voters. Trying to project
how or why people voted (or otherwise engaged politically) a certain way
would be imprudent. Rather than predicting outcomes, our study offers a
more nuanced picture of public opinion about the death penalty, set against
a particular historical backdrop.

Conclusions
Answering the call for paying more attention to respondents typically excluded from analyses, our study suggests that the “unsure” and “don’t know”
respondents are not empirical nuisances. The unsures may have theoretical
importance, both in criminal justice research and public opinion research
more broadly (Laurison, 2015; Oravecz et al., 2014; Unnever et al., 2005).
Rather than relegating them to missing data, future research should consider the roles they may play in public opinion about criminal justice and
other issues. The unsures may not be simply disengaged but instead struggling to form a firm opinion in an information-laden and seemingly unsettled socio-political landscape.
Some have been optimistic about penal reform (Green, 2013; National Research Council, 2014), even in red states (Thielo et al., 2015); others see a
longer road ahead (Woznick 2016b). Gottschalk (2014) cautioned that economic insecurity of the kind exaggerated by the 2007 recession could reignite punitiveness, portending a renewed penal populism (Lehmann and
Pickett, 2016). America’s retributive strain seems to endure. In 2016, California and Nebraska retained their death penalties, while Oklahoma enshrined
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theirs in the state’s constitution despite a moratorium on its use (Cohen,
2016). Indeed, the rise of populism that marked the 2016 election cycle may
be seen in the threads of government distrust among Nebraska’s unsures,
and in the anger and distrust that distinguished Nebraskans who preferred
the death penalty for murder from those who preferred alternatives. Forward momentum on abolishing capital punishment in US states may be (temporarily) halted by a political context that embraces hostile solidarity (Carvalho and Chamberlen, 2018). While the death penalty in the United States
may eventually fall into disuse (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Garland, 2005),
capital punishment still symbolically embodies the expressive desire and
moral imperative to take action against crime and perceived disorder.
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Notes
1. This may account for the discrepancy between Gallup and Pew trends. Gallup’s
survey item is: “Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of
murder?” The response categories are yes/no. Pew’s survey item is: “Do you
strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder?” The response categories reflect the question. Both surveys have options for “don’t know/refused.”
2. While it is possible this group may be excluded because of small analytic numbers, such a justification is typically not forwarded by authors. Rather, “coded
into missing” happens as a matter of routine (e.g., Unnever et al., 2005: 193) or
as a matter of analytic framing (e.g., Messner et al., 2006).
3. Kelley (2015) provided a history of the death penalty in Nebraska in the run up
to the 2015 effort to repeal.
4. The sampling error for both surveys was about 2% to 3%.
5. The samples were older (39% over 65 versus 18.4%) and comprised of more females (59.7% female versus 50.9%) than reflected in the Nebraska 2010 census estimates. Nebraska was approximately 89% White, similar to the samples.
The three state regions (Omaha/Midland, Lincoln/Southeast, Central/West) were
equally represented.
6. In 2016 the Nebraska Catholic Conference advocated against reinstating the death
penalty (Nohr, 2016).
7. Data were from population-based surveys, not registered or likely voters. Laurison (2015) reported that respondents who indicate “don’t know” are also unlikely to vote.
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